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Requiring developing countries to adopt competition laws has become a standard 
element in Free Trade Agreements between those countries and developed countries, 
and in the ‘check list’ of measures sought by the World Bank and other multilateral 
institutions. However, there is little reason to think competition policy will increase 
welfare in those countries, especially as its proper implementation requires institutional 
capabilities that most developing countries lack. Despite this, the ASEAN countries, 
along with many other developing countries, have adopted competition policies that 
mirror all the prohibitions typically found in developed countries. It is suggested 
that it would be preferable were those prohibitions dropped, and competition policy 
refocussed on to a narrower set of instruments and objectives.
JEL: K21, L4
Introduction
This paper examines some economic and institutional aspects of competition law and 
policy, with a particular focus on the implications for developing countries and specifically 
for the countries of ASEAN. While ‘competition policy’ is capable of many definitions 
(including some in which it is coextensive with microeconomic or structural reform), I 
concentrate on competition policy in its trade practices or anti-trust sense, noting that it 
is competition policy in that sense which has come into increasingly widespread applica-
tion in developing countries in recent years. 
  The impetus for this article comes from the tendency of the major developed 
economies (including the United States, the European Union and Australia) to require 
adoption of domestic competition policy as a condition for entering into bilateral free 
trade agreements with developing countries.1 Moreover, introducing competition policy 
legislation has become an integral part of the ‘checklist’ of requirements associated with 
receiving assistance from the multilateral development institutions. However, how clear 
is it that introducing these laws will indeed make developing countries better off?
  The view I have reached is that competition law may do more harm than good. 
Even if it offered potential gains — and even that is debated and debatable — its proper 
implementation greatly exceeds the institutional capability of many developing economies. 
To make matters even worse, by expanding the scope of discretionary intervention in the 2
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economy, it creates additional opportunities for corruption in countries where endemic 
corruption already stifles and distorts economic growth. In these countries, it seems far 
more prudent to adopt the conclusion reached about regulation generally by Edward 
Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer — namely that:
  The first, and arguably most important, message of the model is that [there are situations in 
which] the optimal government policy is to do nothing. When the administrative capacity of 
the government is severely limited, and both its judges and regulators are vulnerable to pressure 
and corruption, it might be better to accept the existing market failures and externalities than 
to deal with them through either the administrative or the judicial process. For if a country 
does attempt to correct market failures, justice will be subverted, and resources will be wasted 
on subversion without successfully controlling market failures.2 
  The structure of this article is as follows. I start by considering the analytical bases 
of, and experience with, competition policy in the advanced economies, then turn to 
examine the particular challenges associated with implementing competition law and 
policy in developing countries. The article concludes with a review and discussion of the 
situation in ASEAN. 
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Competition and Competition Policy
Competition policy is one of the United States’ most successful — though more recent 
— export products. After many years as an American eccentricity, anti-trust law entered 
into a phase of rapid diffusion in the closing years of the twentieth century, both in the 
advanced economies and, perhaps even more startlingly, in the rest of the world. Since 
2000, nearly 70 developing and transition economies have adopted some form of com-
petition law. 
  That this would occur was hardly obvious. While official reverence for the anti-
trust statutes has long been a feature of the American civil religion, it was a feature more 
tolerated than vaunted. Indeed, in his celebrated analysis of the US polity in the late 
1950s, Richard Hofstadter saw anti-trust law as a spent force — one that, by ‘ceasing to 
be an ideology and becoming largely a technique’, had declined into one of ‘a great many 
elements in our society that have become differentiated, specialised and bureaucratised’. 
As a result of that process, ‘the business of studying, attacking, defending and evaluat-
ing oligopolistic behaviour’ was merely ‘one of our lively small industries, which gives 
employment to many gifted professional men’. That, he suggested, was why it survived, 
for ‘it is not our way to liquidate an industry in which so many have a stake’.3 
  How this ‘lively small industry’ became a thriving global endeavour is an intriguing 
question on which many PhD theses in political science are doubtless being written. But 
what makes the question even more intriguing is the fact that there is hardly a consen-
sus among economists on the substantive merits of competition policy. Even regarding 
competition itself, it has rightly been noted that:
  While competition features prominently in the history of economic thought, it is fair to say 
that economists still have a limited, and sometimes contradictory, understanding of its economic 
effects, and in particular, of the relationship between competition and growth. What we have 
accumulated so far are only bits and pieces: on the one hand, theoretical arguments that make 
predictions of either a positive or negative relationship; on the other hand, contrasting pieces 
of historical or empirical evidence.4
  As for competition policy, the state of the science is even more unsettled. This is for 
two closely related reasons. To begin with, changes in ‘competition’, however defined, 
are never free.5 Making an industry ‘more competitive’ (again, however defined) invari-
ably involves a complex of changes — for instance, the addition of productive capacity 
— which impose costs. Left to their own volition, market forces will take account of 
these costs in determining market structure; a priori, it is not possible to say as a matter 
of economics that welfare would be improved by somehow engineering more ‘competi-4
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tion’ than those market forces themselves generate.6 While it is, of course, conceivable 
that market forces will result in less competition than would be socially optimal, it has 
also been known for many years that even a free-entry equilibrium may be characterised 
by ‘too much’ competition, either in the ‘empty core’ sense classically demonstrated by 
Telser,7 or in the sense of the ‘excess entry’ model of Mankiw and Whinston.8
  Second, identifying the specific instances in which ‘more competition’ is prefer-
able to ‘less competition’ is difficult, if not impossible. This means that implementing 
a competition policy — that is, overriding the market structure and conduct decisions 
that result from market forces (and the Coasian bargains that arise from those market 
forces) — invariably involves decisions that have a substantial element of subjectivity, and 
a consequent high vulnerability to error.
  This is true even of those aspects of competition policy that seem most widely 
accepted. For example, although economists have long been critical of cartels, a recent 
authoritative survey notes that: ‘It is in some sense paradoxical that the least controversial 
area of anti-trust [the prohibition on price fixing] is perhaps the one in which the basis of 
policy in economic theory is weakest.’9 As for the evidence on the effects of price fixing, 
it too is far from conclusive, with findings that range from collusive agreements reducing 
prices (for example, Sproul, who finds that prices tend to rise following indictments for 
collusion),10 to no or modest price increases (see Stigler and Kindahl; Sultan; and Porter 
and Zona),11 through to substantial price rises (Connor, noting that Connor’s estimates 
were evidence for the plaintiffs in anti-trust proceedings).12 The evidence on whether 
collusion is harmful in the other dimensions of efficiency is extremely scant, but here 
too it is at best inconclusive (for example, see d’Aspremont, Encauoua and Ponssard).13 
Indeed, in the ‘empty core’ case, collusion will both lower expected prices and improve 
productive efficiency.14 The assumption that price-fixing harms welfare, and does so both 
generally and materially, is therefore not solidly founded. The risk that measures aimed 
at preventing price-fixing will reduce welfare is then magnified by the scope for error in 
detecting whether it has occurred and in setting penalties.
  Issues with respect both to the sign and extent of impacts, as well as about the risk 
of error in assessment, are even greater for the other types of conduct sanctioned by the 
competition laws. 
  Vertical restraints, vertical integration and the risk of foreclosure, which were once 
a major focus of the competition laws,15 are a case in point. A recent survey of these by 
Lafontaine and Slade, is based upon citation of nearly 200 sources, 80 or so of which are 
empirical.16 The authors’ overall conclusion is that:No. 76, 2008
5
  [W]e did not have a particular conclusion in mind when we began to collect the evidence, 
and we have tried to be fair in presenting the empirical regularities. We are therefore somewhat 
surprised at what the weight of evidence is telling us. It says that, under most circumstances, 
profit-maximising vertical integration decisions are efficient, not just from the firms’ but also 
from the consumers’ point of view. Although there are isolated studies that contradict this 
claim, the vast majority support it. Moreover, even in industries which are highly concentrated 
so that horizontal considerations assume substantial importance, the net effect of vertical 
integration appears to be positive in many instances. We therefore conclude that, faced with a 
vertical arrangement, the burden of evidence should be placed on competition authorities to 
demonstrate that the arrangement is harmful before the practice is attacked.17
  It is, of course, possible to devise models in which vertical restraints (be it through 
contract or integration) soften competition, create entry barriers or both — indeed, de-
vising such models has been a substantial growth industry since the pioneering study on 
equilibrium foreclosure by Ordover, Saloner and Salop.18 However, as with other game-
theoretic analyses of anti-competitive exclusion and foreclosure, these models are invari-
ably highly sensitive to the assumptions on which they are based, including importantly 
the essentially untestable assumptions about expectations regarding behaviour off the 
equilibrium path.19 Moreover, it is generally possible to devise more than one such model 
to ‘explain’ any given course of conduct where the implications of the various models for 
welfare differ dramatically. Additionally, it is not usually possible to devise an empirical test 
that will discriminate effectively between these models in a particular fact-situation, both 
because some of the underlying assumptions are not capable of being tested (such as the 
nature of expectations of off-the-equilibrium-path behaviour), while for others there are 
typically too many variables and too few observations.20 As a result, the models are best 
viewed as ‘stories’ — or, to use Frank Fisher’s term, as ‘games economists play’,21 which 
tell us that some things are possible but say little about likelihoods, and which can well 
be dangerous when used as a basis for administrative or judicial decision-making.22
  Exactly the same cautions apply to mergers. Although there is a vast body of theory 
that examines the impact of horizontal and vertical mergers under alternative assump-
tions, there is little evidence that these models do a good job of predicting outcomes 
in general, much less in particular cases. Indeed, one of the best-known studies of the 
predictive ability of merger simulation models finds errors that are substantial, and that 
go in both directions.23 Moreover, even at a theoretical level, the effects of particular 
features of the industry context on merger outcomes are poorly understood and usually 
ambiguous — for example, low entry barriers may reduce or increase the harm associ-
ated with a price-increasing merger;24 equally, consumer switching costs may increase or 6
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reduce the price-elevation effect of a horizontal merger. And it hardly needs to be said 
that little is known that is conclusive about the effect of mergers on innovation, other 
than the fact that no general conclusions can be drawn either from the theory or from 
empirical studies.25 All of these uncertainties are then compounded by the difficulties 
involved in gauging in advance of a merger the extent of the efficiencies it will yield, the 
response of suppliers, competitors and consumers to those efficiencies, and the ultimate 
consequences for the various aspects of welfare.
  In short, even quite basic concepts such as ‘market power’, ‘conduct that lessens 
competition’ and ‘competition on the merits’ are difficult to pin down and even more 
difficult to properly apply.26 The most generous interpretation is that, to use W. D. Gallie’s 
famous classification, these are concepts that are ‘essentially contested’.27 Such ‘essentially 
contested’ concepts are not incapable of being the subject of notions of evidence, cogency 
and rational persuasion, related to ‘the rationality of a given individual’s continued use 
(or change of use) of the concept’, but it is quite impossible to find a general principle, 
of overarching and enduring validity, for ‘deciding which of two contestant uses of an 
essentially contested concept really “uses it best’”.28
Implications for institutional design
This relatively unsettled state of our understanding of competitive processes has important 
implications for the design and functioning of competition policy institutions.29 These 
implications can be seen from the standpoints of both classical jurisprudence and the 
economics of principal–agent relations.
  Thus, internally complex, inherently appraisive and essentially contested concepts 
have long been seen as posing a particular challenge to the integrity of administrative 
and legal decision-making. Max Weber, for example, believed that such concepts were 
inimical to predictable, substantively rational decision-making by administrative and 
judicial entities, and that allowing them as a basis for legal claims invited a descent into 
‘kadi justice’ that undermined the ability of economic actors to plan, contract and ef-
ficiently arrange their affairs.30 Indeed, for Weber the development of a judicial system 
capable of supporting a capitalist economy required the shedding of such concepts from 
the armoury of formal adjudication, though he recognised that the very development 
of a modern economy gave rise to incessant pressures for the reintroduction into law of 
concepts that are ‘amorphous’, for they ultimately do no more than ‘express substantive 
ethical claims’.31
  A similar concern underpins Lon Fuller’s concept of ‘polycentric’ claims in adjudica-
tion — that is, claims that involve many interacting causal factors and where outcomes are 7
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shaped by those causes working through a broad number of actors, only a few of whom 
are parties to the proceedings.32 Fuller hypothesised that attempts to deal with these situ-
ations through the legal system were likely to fail, both because of the inherent complex-
ity of the situation and of our ignorance about cause–effect relationships. Additionally, 
citing industry regulation as a case in point, he argued that the relevant decisions had so 
great an element of subjectivity that the integrity of the decision-making process would 
be undermined, for the decision-maker would become a ‘czar’, ignoring ‘the peculiarly 
urgent demand of rationality’ characteristic of legal-bureaucratic processes. Inevitably, 
that ‘czar’ would ‘gradually drift into a kind of charismatic leadership, the peculiar magic 
of which is valid only within a limited context. Even within that context, the business of 
‘playing God’ can be very dangerous, as experience has often demonstrated.’33
  Seen from a more economic perspective, these concerns reflect an underlying doubt 
about the efficiency of the principal–agent structure inherent in the implementation of 
competition policy. 
  Thus, implementing competition policy requires highly specialised expertise and the 
ability to gather and evaluate complex information; as a result, it is a task that is naturally 
delegated to an agent who either has, or is well placed to acquire and implement, that 
expertise. However, the nature of that task, and the consequent asymmetry in information 
between the agent and the principal, makes it difficult — if not impossible — to evaluate 
the quality of the agent’s actions. The fact that competition policy involves a large number 
of relatively small, heterogenous, decisions — some dealing with approvals, others with 
prohibitions and many with the question of whether or not to act at all — makes perform-
ance monitoring and evaluation all the more difficult. The risk therefore arises that the 
agent will act in its own interests, rather than in the interests of the principal. This is the 
essence of ‘regulatory capture’, in which the agent extracts an information rent from its 
specialised knowledge, by using its discretion to advance its own preferences (for instance, 
for reappointment) and/or to collude with (some of) those it is intended to regulate.34 
The more difficult it is for third parties, including the principal, to monitor and evaluate 
the agent’s conduct, the greater the resulting risks and also the likely welfare costs.
  The greater the agent’s substantive independence, the more these risks and costs 
are increased, since that independence makes it more difficult and costly for the principal 
to monitor the agent’s decision-making processes. However, such independence may be 
particularly desirable if it allows the principal to resolve otherwise costly commitment 
problems. The credibility of commitments becomes especially important when it is de-
sirable for economic agents to make investments that have an element of irreversibility 
in reliance on actual or implied policy promises, and which hence are vulnerable to loss 
should those promises not be kept. Time inconsistency is the canonical form of this com-8
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mitment problem in economics, with the term referring to situations in which conduct by 
a policy-maker that is rational ex ante is not (and is known not to be) rational ex post, so 
that rational actors will discount the probability of a commitment to that conduct being 
maintained. 
  The problem of time inconsistency is readily illustrated in the context in which the 
term was initially developed: monetary policy. Consider a central bank facing a trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, in which current inflation depends also on expecta-
tions of inflation in the future.35 The credible announcement of a future policy tighten-
ing, in excess of that needed to curb current inflationary pressures, lowers inflationary 
expectations, thereby easing today’s trade-off. Given that, it is optimal for policy to seek 
to exhaust the marginal benefits of this announcement effect. However, once the reces-
sion that this tightening implies arrives, the optimal policy is to reverse course, renege 
on the announcement and avoid the recession. But for the original intention to have the 
desired effect, it must be believed to be credible — in other words, for the sacrifice ratio 
(the cumulative increase in unemployment that is due to the disinflation effort divided 
by the total decrease in inflation) to be improved, investors, wage-setters and other price-
making actors must believe that the central bank will not deviate from the policy it has 
announced, regardless of the consequences. The lower the probability attached to the 
central bank staying the course, the less effect the announcement will have on the costs 
of disinflation.
  At least analytically, a similar issue of time inconsistency can arise with respect to 
competition policy. More specifically, consider investments undertaken today in view of 
obtaining quasi-rents in future periods. Altering the competitive rules of the game could 
redistribute or in other ways expropriate those quasi-rents. Such an expropriation might, 
ex post, be of benefit to the principal — for example, if it enriches and hence strengthens 
the coalition on which the principal relies. Given that, investors will be reluctant to in-
vest unless they can be confident that the principal will not engage in time-inconsistent 
behaviour. 
  In Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film Doctor Strangelove, the time inconsistency problem 
is solved through a commitment technology — the ‘doomsday machine’ — that, once 
put in place, will in the event of a surprise nuclear attack automatically ‘destroy all human 
and animal life on earth’, despite the fact that this ‘is not a thing a sane man would do’.36 
In the economic literature, the institutional equivalent of the ‘doomsday machine’ is the 
independent central bank which, vested with the discretion to control inflation, does 
not succumb to the temptation to seek short term gains in real output at the expense of 
long-term price stability. 
  This occurs because the central bank, unlike the executive government, does not 9
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internalise (or internalise to the same extent) the political benefits that short-term output 
expansion would create. In other words, by delegating the control of inflation to the central 
bank, the government severs the costs and benefits of the inflation–real output trade-off, 
assigning the price stability objective to an agent whose benefits depend mainly or solely 
on the inflation rate. In its simplest form (often referred to as ‘Rogoff delegation’),37 this 
is done by vesting control of the central bank in individuals who are especially ‘conserva-
tive’, in the special sense of having an unusually strong aversion to inflation — that is, 
having a utility function in which immediate real output gaps have little weight relative 
to long run price stability.38 Given those preferences, commitments to price stability will 
be regarded as credible, reducing the costs of disinflation.39
  Whether this account of central bank independence is plausible is a matter of in-
tense debate, both regarding the solidity of its theoretical foundations40 and its empirical 
relevance. So too is the question of whether, as a factual matter, central bank independ-
ence, however defined, actually reduces the sacrifice ratio, with perhaps the best that can 
be said being that the case in favour of independence is not proven.41 But even assuming 
it were, there is a substantial difference between the position of a competition authority 
and that of an ‘independent’ central bank, such as the Reserve Bank of Australia or, even 
more so, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
  In effect, the central bank does not have independence with respect to the out-
come it seeks to achieve — rather, a specific inflation target is set by the government (in 
the case of the RBA, through the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy).42 In 
that sense, the bank is given a relatively narrow objective to pursue. All that is delegated 
to the central bank is instrument independence, which is typically very limited in scope 
and which generally involves a relatively small number of readily monitored decisions. 
Moreover, as the bank’s performance in meeting the target is reasonably easily observed, 
its effective accountability is substantial. 
  In contrast, the objectives set by a competition agency are vague at best, and open 
to conflicting interpretation; it has a broad range of instruments it can use to achieve 
those objectives and significant discretion in respect of priorities; its decisions are many, 
heterogeneous and very difficult to observe, much less assess; and it is not possible to 
measure the extent to which its objectives are being met. All of this makes the underlying 
principal–agent problems especially acute in the case of a competition authority and means 
that the costs of delegation and of substantive independence may be high. In short, there 
is nothing that says that, left to its own devices, the agent to whom competition policy 
powers are delegated would impose lower rent-seeking costs than would arise were the 
powers left directly with the principal.43
  As in other principal–agent problems, there are familiar recipes for reducing the 10
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costs and risks of rent-seeking, but they are not costless and their practical efficacy is in 
some respects limited. For example, a standard approach in the theory is to pay the agent 
an efficiency wage — that is, a wage that is marked up above the agent’s opportunity costs 
so as to increase the cost of punishment should shirking or rent-seeking by the agent be 
detected. However, for low probabilities of detection (as would inevitably be the case 
when output is highly costly to measure), the efficiency wage would need to be very high, 
possibly even greater than the economic costs of the rent-seeking, straining economic 
and political acceptability.44 
  Another solution that usually attenuates principal–agent problems is to multiply 
the number of agents to whom powers are delegated. In principle, this could be done by 
allowing agents to compete in the exercise of competition policy responsibilities (hence 
inducing a form of yardstick competition), as happens to some extent in the United 
States,45 possibly reflecting the sheer scale of the US market and hence its greater ability 
to absorb the relevant fixed costs. An alternative is to form distinct agents into a hierar-
chy, as occurs in appellate processes; however, the efficacy of that approach depends on 
the extent to which (and the costs at which) the substantive expertise can be replicated. 
This is obviously difficult to do when the initial process is inquisitorial, and can draw on 
a standing and specialised bureaucracy, while the appellate review process is adversarial, 
and draws on more general expertise.46 Moreover, appellate processes are inefficient when 
their outcomes confer substantial externalities and/or have a public good aspect (as occurs 
when rent-seeking by an agency is curbed for the public benefit), as the parties adversely 
affected by the rent-seeking will have too few incentives to undertake otherwise socially 
desirable litigation (since some part of that benefit flows to others).47
  The implementation of competition policy therefore involves substantial issues of 
institutional design. On the one hand, the desire to bring specialised expertise to bear 
and to enhance time consistency make delegation to an independent agent attractive; on 
the other, the performance of such an agent is inherently difficult to monitor and evalu-
ate, creating serious scope for the agent to take rents for itself, including by indulging its 
own preferences, at a cost to economic efficiency.48
Overall Outcomes 
As a result, there are two types of dangers inherent in the implementation of competi-
tion policy: the risk of error, which arises from the limits of our ability to understand 
how markets work and to identify correctly and give effect to interventions that increase 
welfare by enhancing competition; and the risks arising from principal–agent problems, 
including those of rent-seeking or self-preferment.11
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  Set against the reality of these risks, it is unsurprising that economists’ assessments of 
the record of competition policy are extremely mixed. At the most basic level, it would be 
rare to find a contemporary economist who would endorse the reasoning and most of the 
outcomes underpinning the great anti-trust contests of the twentieth century. Thus there 
are obvious, serious and generally recognised defects in the economic analysis involved 
in landmark cases such Standard Oil, IBM I, II and III, United Shoe Machinery and the 
various Alcoa cases — see Bork’s still remarkable study,49 as well as several others.50 It 
may well be that more recent case law is better informed economically, but many leading 
cases (including the Microsoft decisions and the LePage bundling case) remain mired in 
controversy.51 Equally, Korah52 highlights the many confusions that underpin the leading 
European decisions from the 1960s to the late 1980s, including the persistent failure to 
distinguish carefully ex ante from ex post, and the no less persistent failure to distinguish 
protecting competitors from protecting competition. As regards the more recent EU 
cases, there too the quality of the economic reasoning has improved, but decisions such 
as that in the Honeywell/GE merger are at least problematic. A similar assessment would, 
in my view, await many of the Australian cases were they reviewed as carefully as the ones 
overseas have been.53 
  Nor is the overall or macro assessment much less troubled. Although such analyses 
run into the problems of evaluation stressed above, one recent attempt, by Crandall and 
Winston,54 finds no evidence that US anti-trust policy has improved consumer welfare, 
much less economic efficiency overall. While that assessment has been criticised by Baker,55 
Crandall and Winston’s view is not inconsistent with previous findings such as those of 
Stigler and Kindhal,56 or with Fligstein’s conclusion that anti-trust policy had distorted 
the growth of US corporations into inefficient conglomerate mergers.57 Equally, the well-
known findings of Chandler — that patterns of industrial leadership and market dominance 
in capitalist economies have overwhelmingly reflected underlying efficiency, including in 
countries (or at times) where competition laws were not in effect — seem at odds with the 
view that an active competition policy is needed to ensure economic efficiency.58 After all, 
countries such as Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and The Netherlands achieved very high 
levels of productivity and of per capita incomes in the post-war period while tolerating 
(and in some instances enforcing) myriad practices that in any other country would be 
considered serious breaches of the competition laws.59
  Of course, the OECD and others attempt to use cross-country regressions to analyse 
the effect of competition policy, usually by adding dummies for competition policy to 
data sets of economic outcomes. However, for the reasons cogently set out by Bardhan 
(2005), it is not easy to put much weight on studies of this kind. Typically, causal links 
are only sparsely identified and tested; there are serious problems with endogeneity and 12
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omitted variable bias; and changing the instruments and the variables has been shown 
to alter the results materially. Overall, the results would be more convincing if they were 
consistent with, rather than at odds with, the more micro assessments.
  This is not to imply that competition policy is necessarily harmful. Rather, the point 
is that its design, implementation and outcomes are far from simple or unproblematic, even 
in countries such as the United States that have long experience in competition analysis, 
an abundant pool of expert economists and lawyers, ready access to relevant data, and a 
well-trained and highly professional judiciary. 
The Developing Country Context
The challenges for competition policy implementation in developing economies are, 
however, even greater than this assessment suggests. This is because of both the economic 
context and the problems of governance.
The economic context
While many issues are involved in successful economic development, a critical problem is 
that of the credibility of commitments, and in particular of commitments not to exploit 
trading partners.60 This problem of trust arises most obviously with respect to the state 
(and is discussed below in that context), but is also an issue between private parties. 
(Commitment problems between the state and economic agents are usually described 
as being ‘vertical’ in character, while those between agents are ‘horizontal’.) In contexts 
where legal remedies are costly, discriminatory and often ineffective, difficulties in secur-
ing and retaining trust increase transaction costs and hence erode the gains from trade. 
At the same time, the absence of effective commitment devices makes it more difficult for 
parties to coordinate sunk investments that are strategic complements, such as where the 
marginal return from one party’s investment is an increasing function of the investments 
made by others. As has long been known, the failure to undertake these complementary 
investments can generate and perpetuate equilibria at low levels of output and of per 
capita income.61
  These problems of horizontal commitment are capable of being mitigated by 
‘self-help’ remedies that, viewed superficially, seem anti-competitive. Two such remedies 
are especially important. The first type constitutes those associated with the creation and 
protection of investments in reputation. All reputation-based approaches to engendering 
and enforcing trust involve costs, and those costs are greater the less effective are the 
mechanisms for detecting and punishing breaches of trust. As has been shown,62 multi-
lateral monitoring and punishment devices (where admission is granted and punishment 1
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is enforced by a community) are more efficient than bilateral devices (that is, situations 
where the cheater is punished only by the cheated). The greater cost to the cheater of the 
multilateral punishment, and the increased risk of detection, mean that less of a mark-up 
needs to be paid to potential trading partners over their reservation wages to induce hon-
est trade, so that more mutually advantageous trades can be undertaken.63 However, in 
countries where state structures are costly or ineffective in protecting bargains, securing 
those outcomes requires institutional mechanisms (which may be formal, such as guilds, 
or informal, such as family, clan, caste, ethnic and religious networks) that limit entry, 
refuse to deal with non-members or outsiders, and impose and enforce group boycotts 
on cheaters or on high-risk trading partners. Even in countries where open, legal-ra-
tional, systems of rule-making have developed, these mechanisms can remain important 
in underpinning relational contracts;64 their role is even greater when such rule-making 
is limited and/or does not cover the geographical range of mutually advantageous trades 
(as in the Chinese trading communities studied by Redding).65
  The second set of mechanisms relates to groupings of economic agents that coor-
dinate durable, specialised and complementary investments. This coordination function 
can be undertaken within industrial groups (as has historically been important in France66, 
Japan67 and Korea68) that bring together producers in adjacent, at least partly competitive 
activities; by financial institutions, that enforce or encourage cooperation through their 
debt positions and ownership stakes (as in Sweden69 and Germany70); through direct 
coordination between separate enterprises, including agreement over prices and quanti-
ties, as historically occurred and still occurs in Italian ‘industrial districts’;71 and through 
combinations of all of these. Although these mechanisms have an inherently poor fit to 
the conventional competitive model, particularly when they bring together suppliers that 
are closely related and overlapping, few would dispute their role in economic develop-
ment.
  As a result, structures, agreements and practices (such as refusals to deal with en-
trants) that seem anti-competitive are often an efficient adaptation to the need to impose 
order and predictability in trading and investment relations. There is therefore even less 
presumption than there would be in mature industrial economies that outcomes would 
be enhanced were these practices restricted or prohibited, especially in the absence of 
effective, state-based alternatives. 
The governance and institutional context
This leads naturally to a consideration of the vertical dimension of the commitment prob-
lem, that is the credibility of the commitment by the state and its agents not to expropriate 
traders and investors. The critical form this problem takes is that of corruption, which is 14
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the primary form this expropriation typically takes. 
  There are three key preconditions for corruption:
•  the vesting in officials of discretionary powers;
•  the presence of economic rents, that may either be extracted by officials, or created 
by those officials in exchange for some part of those rents; and
•  weak institutions, lacking in the accountability mechanisms needed to deter officials 
from using public office for private gain.72 
  Given those preconditions, the extent of corruption is greatest when decisions 
taken by officials are difficult to identify, monitor and assess. One factor that compounds 
that difficulty is when the payers and receivers of bribes can collude, as in the creation 
and protection of rents. In that case — which Shleifer and Vishny7 term ‘corruption 
without theft’ — the victims have no incentive to assist in the detection and punishment 
of corruption, though the resulting relationships then become vulnerable to blackmail 
and extortion, including by other officials. Of course, those difficulties of identification 
and detection are especially great when the inherent merits of decisions are not readily 
assessed, and when reasonable pretexts can be provided by officials for deciding as they 
have. 
  These conditions are readily met in the case of competition policy. To begin with, 
the decision by officials to permit, prohibit or ignore conduct can be associated with 
substantial rents for those directly affected. Incentives for parties to collude with officials 
in the taking of those decisions, and share the gains, are therefore strong. Moreover, few 
such decisions are, or can ever be, formulaic; indeed, even attempts at making them so 
— say, by relying on market share rules — generally fail, as they simply divert the deci-
sion-maker’s discretion from other judgements to the definition of the relevant market 
(or other basis for the attempted formula). Further, some of the most important decisions 
— which are decisions not to act — are not generally reported and may not be observable. 
And it is very rarely the case that no sensible reason can be given for whatever decision 
is taken. As a result, it is virtually impossible to identify ‘aberrant’ decisions and subject 
them to investigation. 
  At the same time, the gains from corruption can be high. Inquisitorial powers can 
be used to identify the quantum of the rents accruing to a party, reducing the information 
disadvantage that often limits the gains from corruption in other areas. Additionally, it is 
often obvious which cases are likely to have the greatest ability to pay, avoiding the need 
to devise complex revelation schemes for willingness to pay, such as those examined by 
Liu.74 Moreover, the mere fact that a merger is being sought will itself signal the potential 
for a profit gain, and hence allow officials to share in that gain. Finally, the fact that the 
corruption can readily be non-pecuniary, as in the imposing of conditions on mergers or 15
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other conduct that advantage groups, clients or constituents linked to the decision-maker, 
reduces the risk of detection and hence increases the gains in an expected value sense. 
It is therefore not surprising that Ades and Di Tella75 find that corruption is greater in 
countries that have discretionary forms of industry intervention.
  No simple but effective ways of dealing with these issues have yet been identified. 
Indeed, some of the conventional prescriptions appear to make matters worse or at least, 
can do so. For example, increasing the number of officials involved in decisions creates 
multiple veto points, and gives rise to a double marginalisation problem (in which each 
official takes a ‘cut’ either so as to make a decision happen, or so as to prevent it), yielding 
higher overall corruption than would otherwise have occurred.76 Indeed, in the extreme 
case, where there are multiple layers of decision-making, each with its own, uncoordi-
nated, claim on the rents, outcomes come to resemble the ‘roving bandit’ case famously 
discussed by Mancur Olson77 and known to be far more inimical to economic growth 
than the ‘stationary bandit’ whose monopoly status allows him to internalise the benefits 
of economic progress.
  These problems are not improved to any material extent through monitoring by 
aid-granting organisations. As is discussed at length in Easterly, and has been shown more 
formally by Seabright,78 the incentive structures of international aid programs are poorly 
geared to the monitoring of outcomes, and may indeed undermine that monitoring, for 
instance by creating joint agency problems.79 The natural tendency in such programs is 
to focus on inputs, or at best on the most readily measured outputs, with a marked incli-
nation to a ‘tick the box’ approach as far as institutional issues are concerned — that is, 
a tendency to require that certain institutions be set up and laws passed, with little real 
scope to monitor their effects. As Easterly well explains, it is that ‘tick the box’ approach 
that has led to the proliferation in recipient countries of institutions they are very poorly 
equipped to operate and that merely create further opportunities for poor governance 
and corruption.
  All of this matters because it is now well known that corruption, both in its more 
venal forms and also in the form of ‘influence peddling’ on behalf of client groups, is 
especially harmful to development. Although bribes are mere transfers (and hence do not 
necessarily entail the direct resource cost involved in other forms of rent-seeking), the 
fact that corruption inevitably taxes some activities and firms and not others, and does 
so at widely varying rates, distorts the allocation of talent, technology and capital away 
from their socially most productive uses.80 Moreover, the scope for corrupt officials to 
expropriate future rents (for instance, by threatening to prosecute firms with a strong 
market position) discourages investment and can particularly penalise activities (such as 
mergers that require approval) that otherwise would rearrange ownership rights in ways 16
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that maximise wealth. Last but not least, the fact that corruption is invariably illegal leads 
to investments in concealment, deception and evasion that positively reduce wealth, as 
when bribes are paid in inefficient ways (for instance, by the imposing of conditions on 
approvals that advantage the official’s clients, but do so by less than would a direct pecu-
niary transfer).
  It is therefore far from reassuring that so many countries with weak governance 
and apparently high and endemic levels of corruption have adopted competition policy 
institutions in recent years, often as a condition of receiving international aid. As can be 
seen from Table 1, of the 10 developed and developing countries that have enacted 
competition policy laws, there are 52 that are rated as very corrupt by Transparency 
International (that is, they have a corruption perception score of  or less) and twelve 
that are both highly corrupt and have a ‘serious’ or worse rating on the George Mason 
University/ University of Maryland State Fragility Index (noting that the State Fragility 
Index is only available for a smaller sample of countries). Under these circumstances, there 
must be a substantial risk that the combination of poor governance, weak human resources 
and the inherent complexity of competition policy will lead to far worse outcomes than 
would prevail had the competition powers not been enacted.
Table 1 Number of countries with a competition law in effect in 2008, ranked by level 
of the State Fragility Index and the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index
  State Fragility Index  Transparency International Corruption 
`    Perception Index
High  5  9 to 10 (low)  8 
Serious   11  8 to 8.9  6 
Moderate  20  7 to 7.9  7 
Low   22  6 to 6.9  7 
Little or no  42  5 to 5.9  9 
    4 to 4.9  14 
     to .9  2 
    2 to 2.9  2 
    1 to 1.9 (high)  1
Note: For the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, lower values of the index imply 
higher levels of corruption. 
Source: Compiled by the author.17
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The Situation in ASEAN
Turning now to the situation in ASEAN, the main features of the competition law ar-
rangements are summarised in Table 2, which is organised using a scheme set out by 
Neven,81 who examines features of European competition law according to five criteria, 
which are:
•  the scope of the statute, that is, the substantive conduct covered by the statutory 
provisions;
•  the nature of proof taking, that is, the balance between inquisitorial and adversarial 
forms of collecting and testing evidence;
•  the standard of proof, in the sense of the evidentiary threshold that must be met;
•  the set of sufficient facts, which refers to the presence of indicia that constitute prima 
facie proof the matter, that is, they are deemed to suffice to make out the contravention; 
and
•  the standard of review, that is, the scope for appeal against administrative decisions. 
  Of the five countries that have a competition law, as such, in place — Indonesia, 
Laos (draft legislation only), Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam — all with the exception of 
Singapore have included prohibitions on all forms of potentially anti-competitive conduct, 
including horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, unilateral abuse, and potentially 
anticompetitive mergers.82 Singapore has no prohibitions in place on vertical agreements. 
Additionally, all have some form of deeming provisions which proscribes, on a per se basis,83 
collusion, as well as for Indonesia price discrimination and for Singapore (which echoes 
the EU formulation) conditions unrelated to the substance of the agreement. As regards 
the standard of proof, which is most relevant where these per se provisions do not apply 
(or when it is contested whether the conditions under which they apply are met), it is 
invariably the balance of probabilities. With the exception of Laos, there are provisions 
for appeals on the merits, though those appeals appear to be primarily in the ordinary 
courts. 
  Overall, these countries therefore have far-ranging prohibitions — typically with 
the same reach as those in the OECD countries, though Singapore lacks a prohibition 
on vertical agreements — largely administered, and seemingly often determined, by the 
inquisitorial body charged with responsibility for competition policy. Moreover, the thresh-
old for liability is in some instances very low — for instance, in Vietnam, a 0 per cent 
market share is sufficient to bring a firm within the ambit of the prohibition on unilateral 
abuse84 (a lower threshold than the Australian High Court found in its Boral decision, 
and far lower than the required level of market power for a monopolisation claim to be 
heard in the United States). Additionally, in at least some cases, that body has far-reaching 
powers — for example, in Thailand to search for and seize information85 and in Vietnam 18
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to impose custodial sentences.86
  With the exception of Singapore, which has a relatively high level of disclosure,87 
relatively little information is available with respect to enforcement,88 though it is known 
that a number of investigations have been undertaken in the other jurisdictions. It appears 
that the ratio of investigations to identified contraventions is high, with investigations 
generally resulting in a decision not to proceed.89 For reasons discussed at length above, 
it is difficult to interpret this outcome, as it could be consistent either with undesirable 
influence-activities leading to meritorious cases not being pursued, or with a genuinely 
reaching finding that a contravention was unlikely to be found were the investigation to 
proceed.
  As regards the ASEAN countries which do not have a competition law in place, 
the Philippines has a number of provisions, including constitutional prohibitions on mo-
nopoly, which are implemented through a range of legislative instruments. Thus, Article 
XII, section 19 of the 1987 Constitution states that the state shall regulate or prohibit 
monopolies when the public interest so requires. Further, no combinations in restraint 
of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. However, the Philippines currently does 
not have a comprehensive competition law regime. Instead, competition policy and law 
is implemented at the sectoral level, with at least eight separate pieces of legislation that 
contain elements of the competition framework, including the Penal Code (RA 815), 
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (RA 829), the Price Act (RA 7581) and 
the Consumer Act of the Philippines (RA 794). The enforcement and regulation of unfair 
trade practices and anticompetitive behaviour are vested in numerous agencies such as 
the Tariff Commission, the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection within 
the Department of Trade and Industry, the Intellectual Property Office, the National 
Telecommunication Commission, and the Energy Regulatory Commission. As well as 
causing administrative complexity, this can make it more difficult to monitor procedural 
integrity (as it can give rise to the multiple veto point problem) and creates the risk of 
double marginalisation discussed above.
  Finally, Malaysia is expected to issue a draft competition law in the near future, 
though the scope and content of that law are not known at this point.
  Overall, in those countries that do have competition statutes in place, both the 
scope of the prohibitions and the nature of the implementation arrangements seem ambi-
tious and potentially disproportionate. The possible exception in this respect is Singapore, 
which has been more measured in the coverage of its prohibitions (notably through the 
exclusion of vertical restraints), has broadly set and implemented higher thresholds for 
intervention, and additionally benefits from generally good governance arrangements, 
excellent access to specialised skills and a highly capable commercial judiciary. 19
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  The risks associated with the potential reach of the prohibitions — prohibitions 
that, poorly interpreted, have great scope to harm efficiency — are compounded by the 
nature of the legal system in most ASEAN countries, and indeed in most developing 
countries. By and large (and again with the clear exception of Singapore, which has in-
herited the British common law tradition), developing countries rely on systems of civil 
law, in which courts neither have, nor are used to exercising, broadly defined discretions 
to ‘fill in’ gaps in statute law. Yet few areas of law are as dependent on the exercise of that 
discretion than the competition laws. As the late Professor William F. Baxter, eminent 
anti-trust scholar and Assistant Attorney General for Anti-trust in the US Department 
of Justice in the Reagan years, explained, anti-trust law, properly applied, is common law 
par excellence, for:
An adaptive approach to anti-trust law is necessary both because of the diversity and rapidly 
changing nature of the business conduct to be scrutinised, and because of the continuing 
progress of economic theory in explaining why firms pursue certain strategies and the competi-
tive consequences of their behaviour.90
  Yet very few countries have judiciaries that have the training, or even the scope 
under their judicial system, for this kind of ongoing reinterpretation of statutes. Espe-
cially in developing economies, where the proper interpretation and implementation of 
the competition laws encounters all of the problems discussed above, the danger of this 
resulting in inefficiencies must be great. 
Conclusions
Competition policy has, to use the colloquial expression, ‘spread like a rash’ in recent 
years, and the ASEAN economies are no exception. A requirement to implement such a 
policy has become a common element in bilateral Free Trade Agreements with developed 
countries, as well as being part of the ‘tick the box’ list of institutional reforms imposed 
by the major aid donors. However, the intellectual basis upon which competition law 
and policy rest is far from robust.
  Thus, even at the analytical level, the foundations of competition policy are uncer-
tain and contested. As for its implementation, it encounters potentially serious problems 
of administrative discretion, as well as a high risk of error. Economic assessments of its 
impacts, even in countries with excellent governance, strong institutions and abundant 
expertise, are mixed. All of this seems to make it poorly suited to environments where 
those resources of governance, institutions and expertise are lacking. The vulnerability 
of competition policy to corruption or influence-peddling only makes these concerns 20
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greater. So does the fact that economic development often requires mechanisms and ar-
rangements that, viewed superficially, seem anti-competitive.
  Seen in this light, the competition statutes recently implemented in a number of 
ASEAN economies seem overly broad in their reach and vest excessive powers in those 
responsible for their implementation. A substantial narrowing of the scope of the statu-
tory powers and prohibitions would be desirable, as would a refocusing of the activities 
of the competition agencies towards a concentration on introducing competition into 
the public sector. 
  Specifically, with the exception of Singapore (which has broadly set and implemented 
higher thresholds for intervention, and additionally benefits from generally good govern-
ance arrangements, excellent access to specialised skills and a highly capable commercial 
judiciary), it would be sensible for them to prune back substantially the prohibitions they 
have in place or (in the case of Laos) are proposing to enact, by:
•  restricting the per se provisions to price fixing in the supply of goods to public 
authorities;
•  setting a high threshold for prohibitions on other forms of horizontal agreements;
•  not imposing prohibitions on vertical agreements or on abuse of dominance, except 
where that abuse is undertaken by a statutory monopoly; and
•  only prohibiting mergers leading to monopoly, or at least to market dominance.
  Moreover, the functions of the competition authorities could usefully be reoriented 
to the competition advocacy role, especially with respect to public sector activity. Specifi-
cally, their priority should lie in ensuring that monopolies are not created or perpetuated by 
the state other than in those instances where the net benefits from statutory controls over 
entry and conduct exceed the costs. As Schumpeter (who viewed the American devotion 
to the anti-trust laws as a puzzle ‘not without interest for the student of the psychology 
of political discussion’) put it, ‘under conditions of intact capitalism’, monopoly power 
‘[can] hardly persist for a period long enough to matter ... unless buttressed by public 
authority’.91 While Schumpeter’s statement might be too strong, it seems difficult to 
deny that it is eliminating that ‘buttressing by public authority’ that would likely bring 
the greatest gains to developing economies.21
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Table 2 Main Features of Competition Policy in ASEAN 
  Horizontal agreements 
Indonesia
Scope  Finding of causing ‘monopolistic practices and/or unfair business    
  competition’, except for collusive output or price fixing agreements  
  and price discrimination agreement where finding of the fact suffices. 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No, except for collusive output and price fixing agreements and price  
  discrimination agreements, 
Standard of review  Merits 
Singapore 
Scope  Finding of preventing, restricting or distorting competition, except   
  for collusive agreements or agreements which impose supplementary  
  obligations with no connection with the subject of agreement where  
  finding of fact suffices. Exemption if finding that agreement    
  contributes to improving production or distribution or promotes    
  economic or technical progress. 
Proof taking  Adversarial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No, except for collusive agreements or agreements which impose    
  supplementary obligations with no connection with the subject of    
  agreement. 
Standard of review  Merits 
Thailand 
Scope  Finding of fact that particular prohibited agreements have been    
  entered into suffices. Exemption if finding that agreement is beneficial  
  to business promotion and has no serious harm. 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  Per se for identified agreements 
Standard of review  Merits 
Vietnam 
Scope  Finding of fact that particular agreements have been entered into 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  Per se for enumerated agreements 
Standard of review  Merits 22
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  Vertical agreements  
Indonesia 
Scope  Finding that conduct causes unfair business competition and/or    
  damage to the public except for closed contracts for which finding of  
  fact suffices. 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No except for closed contracts 
Standard of review  Merits 
Singapore 
Scope  n.a. 
Proof taking  n.a. 
Standard of proof  n.a. 
Set of sufficient facts  n.a. 
Standard of review  n.a. 
Thailand 
Scope  Finding of domination plus engaging in enumerated conduct or  
  finding of conduct amounting to ‘monopoly, reduction of competition  
  or restriction of competition’. Particular exemptions specified. 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No 
Standard of review  Merits 
Vietnam 
Scope  Finding of engaging in enumerated conduct 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  Finding of engaging in enumerated conduct 
Standard of review  Merits 
  Unilateral abuse 
Indonesia 
Scope  Finding of taking advantage of dominant position to enumerated anti-
competitive outcomes. 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No 
Standard of review  Merits 2
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Singapore 
Scope  Finding of abuse of dominant position 
Proof taking  Adversarial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No 
Standard of review  Merits 
Thailand 
Scope  Finding that firm has more than 50 per cent market share and at least  
  1000 million baht turnover and engages in enumerated conduct 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  More than 50 per cent market share and at least 1000 million baht   
  turnover and engages in enumerated conduct 
Standard of review  Merits 
Vietnam 
Scope  Finding that firm has 0 per cent or more market share and engages in  
  enumerated conduct. 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  0 per cent or more market share and enumerated conduct 
Standard of review  Merits 
 
  Mergers 
Indonesia 
Scope  Finding that merger might cause ‘monopolistic practices and/or unfair  
  business competition’ 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No 
Standard of review  Merits 
Singapore 
Scope  Finding that merger results in SLC.  Exemption if finding that SLC  
  outweighed by economic efficiencies. 
Proof taking  Adversarial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No 
Standard of review  Merits 24
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Thailand 
Scope  Finding that merger may result in monopoly or unfair competition.  
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  No 
Standard of review  Merits 
Vietnam 
Scope  Finding that combined market share is above 50%. Exemption if    
  finding that merger prevents bankruptcy or promotes exports or    
  contributes to socioeconomic development and/or technical and    
  technological progress 
Proof taking  Inquisitorial 
Standard of proof  Balance of probabilities 
Set of sufficient facts  Combined market share above 50% 
Standard of review  Merits 
Source: Compiled by the author.
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